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Abstract 
Within the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations 
Environment Programme and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have all 
highlighted climate risks as relevant to their (post)conflict work, endorsing human security 
approaches as valid for mapping the relationships between climate stresses and conflict-related 
harm. While this policy interest has limited operational presence, I discuss salient assessments of 
climate vulnerability in (post)conflict areas, arguing that these agencies have applied a natural 
disaster rather than conflict regulation inflection of humanitarian reason. The former entails a 
biopolitical paradigm of disaster risk reduction, prescribing technical-managerial measures to build 
the resilience of vulnerable populations. This framing supports a depoliticised stance reflecting UN 
norms of neutrality and impartiality. I claim that this position nevertheless disregards its own 
geopolitical conditions and effects, which dilute the scope for international humanitarian law to 
assign responsibility for conflict-related harm. 
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International humanitarian and development actors have shown growing interest in how climate 
change may impact on vulnerable populations in (post)conflict areas. Within the United Nations 
(UN) system, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have all 
highlighted climate risks as relevant to their work in conflict-affected regions, including climate 
change adaptation (UNDP), post-conflict environmental assessments (UNEP), and disaster risk 
management (OCHA).  By “(post)conflict” is meant areas with current or recent historical 
experience of violent conflict and/or foreign military occupation. Notwithstanding their different 
mandates, all three UN agencies have identified climate vulnerability as a legitimate thematic 
concern for assessing the potential sources of insecurity in societies marred by conflict. 
 
Climate insecurity denotes a condition under which the effects of climate variability and/or change 
are represented as threatening to a group of affected actors. This definition mirrors the claim, made 
both by critical geopolitics and securitisation theory, that climate insecurity is realised by discursive 
practices invoking (current or projected) climatic events as an existential threat, thereby justifying 
urgent measures in response.
1
 The constructivist thrust of this formulation has challenged a larger 
body of mainstream analysis, much of it flowing from think-tanks and NGOs, seeing climate 
change as an externally received danger to countries and populations. Threats to national security 
are the dominant concern, with dislocative impacts on sovereign states anticipated in the wake of 
more extreme climate stresses. An influential thesis in this state-centred discourse is that, for poorer 
regions of the world already subject to political instability and violent conflict, climate change will 
act as a “threat multiplier”.2 At a geopolitical level, Western anxieties about the damaging spillover 
effects from threat multiplication in these volatile regions have led to the incorporation of climate 
change as a security concern in national intelligence assessments and military planning. 
 
An alternative pathway of securitisation assigns vulnerable people as the subject to be made safe in 
the face of serious climate risks. The notion of human security, as developed over two decades 
within the UN system, identifies insecurity in whatever chronic threats and disruptive events 
endanger core human needs. As noted below, there is no settled specification of human security; 
however, a growing body of social scientific research is applying human security ideas to climate 
change and other global environmental problems.
3
 From this scholarship has emerged an interest in 
how climate threats to human security may be magnified in (post)conflict settings.
4
 For UN bodies 
with operational mandates in such areas, climate risk management therefore overlaps with 
humanitarian interventions designed to protect vulnerable civilians and their livelihood contexts. 
So-called “complex emergencies”,5 where violent conflict causes a total or considerable breakdown 
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of authority and major human suffering, may be exacerbated by climate stresses, although 
international assistance is typically and understandably preoccupied with delivering immediate 
relief. 
 
Human security thinking marks out as a global political norm the protection of populations at risk. 
Its close affinity with humanitarianism is particularly clear when addressing climate risks in 
(post)conflict areas, because in these settings the two principal referents of humanitarian action – 
natural disasters and armed conflict – converge. Human security, like humanitarianism, highlights 
serious risks to the lives of people; and in regions prone to violence, securing life can legitimate 
external measures, under “responsibility to protect”, that challenge the sovereign authority of the 
host or controlling state.
6
 Not all commentators are sanguine about this: critical scholars have 
charged human security as a “biopolitical technology of governance” designed to manage climate 
risks in a way that renders them less threatening to Western geopolitical and geo-economic 
interests.
7
  As elaborated in the next section, the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics identifies regimes 
of power that have as their target the biological attributes of populations, entailing the deployment 
of particular techniques of security.
8
 Drawing on recent formulations of biopolitical power, I argue 
that the convergence of climate change and humanitarianism generates distinctive rationalities of 
human insecurity. At the same time, geopolitical modes of securitisation are not absent, for state 
security imperatives condition and constrain efforts to protect vulnerable people from conflict-
mediated climate dangers. The core aim of this paper is critically to apply this biopolitical lens to 
examine UN assessments of climate vulnerability in (post)conflict areas. 
 
Below I identify UN framings of climate vulnerability addressing populations affected by violent 
conflict. At the strategic level, climate risks are constructed as part of an emergency temporality 
justifying humanitarian and development assistance in these contexts, as evident in policy 
statements and other agency reports. OCHA, UNDP and UNEP have all endorsed human security 
approaches as valid for mapping the relationships between climate stresses and conflict-related 
harm. This policy interest still has limited operational presence, though I discuss salient assessments 
of climate vulnerability in (post)conflict areas, arguing that these agencies have applied a natural 
disaster rather than conflict regulation inflection of humanitarian action. The former entails a 
biopolitical paradigm of disaster risk reduction, prescribing technical-managerial measures to build 
the resilience of vulnerable populations. Yet, as I claim, this assumes a depoliticised stance, which 
reflecting UN norms of neutrality and deference to geopolitical realities, dilutes moves under 
international humanitarian law (IHL) to assign responsibility for conflict-related harm.  
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HUMANITARIANISM, HUMAN SECURITY AND CLIMATE VULNERABILITY 
 
Global humanitarian governance comprises a distinctive set of policies and instruments, which are 
designed to limit the harm caused by disasters and armed conflict. The construction of climate 
change impacts as a humanitarian concern has found its principal justification in the humanitarian 
tradition of risk reduction and relief provision with reference to “natural disasters”. For both the UN 
and humanitarian NGOs this categorisation is strengthened by claims that human-induced climate 
change is making extreme weather events more frequent, intense and enduring, with 
disproportionate effects on socially vulnerable and marginalised groups.
9
 At the same time, it also 
reflects the onset, since the late 1980s, of a dramatic growth in humanitarian action, put down to 
post-Cold War shifts in global politics, such as the increasing willingness of states to support 
humanitarian assistance, a governance concern with minimising the negative side-effects of new 
global interdependencies, and the need to address complex, conflict-laden humanitarian crises.
10
 
Responses by the international community to complex emergencies mark a step-change in 
humanitarian agency, moving from event-specific relief operations to protracted external 
interventions. For Craig Calhoun, who sees the idea of emergency – a sudden, unpredictable event 
causing suffering or danger – as a core justification for modern humanitarianism, climate change 
and other forms of environmental degradation are increasingly drawn into social imaginaries of 
emergency, including areas subject to armed conflict.
11
 At the same time, a growing overlap 
between military operations and humanitarian interventions invites the possibility that climate 
change could be securitised to support moves by state actors to control natural resources or block 
movements of people displaced by environmental collapse. 
 
A number of authors have applied, and extended, Foucault’s account of biopolitics – the historical 
rise of regimes of power concerned with the biological management of populations – to examine the 
securitisation of biotechnological and wider environmental changes.
12
 For example, Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero identify a profound transformation of life itself as a result of molecular and digital 
revolutions, threatening the stability and safety of “species being”. In a risky, contingent world, 
biopolitical security is distinguished from geopolitical security in seeking an optimal circulation of 
life opportunities rather than protecting a sovereign state from external enemies or dangers.
13
 
Human security is emblematic of biopolitics insofar as it concerns governmental practices which 
address the health and welfare of populations: in humanitarian emergencies this entails urgent 
interventions, often by external actors, claiming to protect people from immediate danger and to 
assist in meeting their basic needs. In parallel with responses to climate risks, these practices 
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prioritise effective anticipation of, and adaptation to, major stresses – what is increasingly labelled 
“resilience” after related concepts in psycho-social and biophysical sciences.14 Risk calculation and 
assessment is a common biopolitical technique for addressing both climate change and violent 
conflict, which share a futurity of catastrophic harm or at least serious threats to life. Grove, for 
example, reveals how the employment by the UN and World Bank of climate risk management and 
insurance tools underwrites the biopolitical management of insecure populations in fragile or failed 
states. Such tools draw on scientific modelling and economic accounting to generate probabilistic 
forecasts about future losses.
15
 The volatility of violent conflict may seem to defy such predictive 
analysis. Yet humanitarian interventions in conflict areas also feature the careful assessment of 
costs and benefits according to principles of necessity, proportionality and efficiency – what 
Weizman labels the economy of violence.
16
 In both cases, securing human lives involves classifying 
and managing resilience in the face of serious threats. 
 
There are distinctive spatialities associated with the humanitarian governance of natural disasters 
and conflicts. The notion of a “globalized biopolitics” refers both to the extraterritoriality and 
extralegality of modern humanitarianism.
17
 First, its spatial reach is expansive, encompassing the 
transnational mobility of humanitarian actors and their professed global concern with vulnerable 
human lives wherever suffering is found. Human security, as a biopolitical category, directs 
attention to precarious contexts of living which are often shaped by global processes of social and 
ecological change.
18
 Second, a globalized biopolitics does not float free of sovereign state power. 
From this perspective, Duffield claims that human security embodies Western geopolitical interests 
as a means of containing the spillover effects of weak and failed states, defining it as “effective 
states prioritizing the well-being of populations living within ineffective ones.”19 The extralegal 
aspect is attributed to a state of exception – the suspension of conventional rule-making in response 
to a declared emergency – which draws military and humanitarian logics into uneasy coexistence. 
While this condition is not exclusive to (post)conflict areas (for example, the state of emergency 
created in 1999 by the Venezuelan government in response to heavy flooding and landslides), it has 
more salience for complex emergencies and other conflict-related conditions.
20
 The geopolitical 
selectivity of humanitarian governance in areas of armed conflict reflects ongoing tensions between 
the universal scope of IHL and the strategic interests of states (and international organisations) that 
support protective interventions in some regions but not others. 
 
Populations facing or recovering from armed conflict are especially vulnerable to climate variability 
and extremes because of impaired coping options and low adaptive capacity.
21 
In its contribution to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Working 
 6 
Group II states that fragile governance systems and violent conflicts typically heighten the 
vulnerability of people to climate risks, though only with reference to Africa.
22
 However, these are 
tentative claims, and the IPCC has since acknowledged that there is the need for more systematic 
research on the climate change-conflict nexus, including the more controversial thesis that climate 
change stresses may increase the risk of violent conflict.
23
 This topic is briefly discussed in a recent 
special report on managing the risks of climate extremes (SREX), with conflict tendencies 
attributed to local, climate-induced impacts on human security.
24
 In its SREX report the IPCC 
defines human security as “safety from such chronic acts as hunger, disease and repression and 
…protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, 
jobs or communities.”25 Though not cited, this definition reproduces a seminal definition of human 
security presented by UNDP.
26
 Since the mid-1990s, this formulation has appeared in a number of 
UNDP-sponsored National Human Development Reports, including those covering such volatile, 
conflict-prone countries as Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq and Sierra Leone.
27
 Environmental 
degradation constitutes a separate category of threat to human security in this framework with 
climate change seen as an ever greater risk to basic freedoms: by 2007 UNDP described climate 
change as arguably the greatest challenge facing global poverty reduction and human development 
efforts.
28
 To be sure, the Human Development Report Office has an organisational autonomy within 
UNDP, which has limited its influence over projects and operational activities, including the 
agency’s major role as implementer of climate change mitigation and adaptation projects through 
the Global Environment Facility.
29
 There is a gap between the thematic treatment of human security 
in HDR reports and climate vulnerability assessments within UNDP-assisted National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action under the UN climate change convention, though the latter reports tend to be 
people-centred in content. In the next section I highlight one UNDP-funded climate adaptation 
project in a (post)conflict area, the occupied Palestinian territory, which encountered tensions 
between biophysical and conflict-related representations of climate insecurity.  
 
The broad notion of human security developed by UNDP has achieved some policy traction in the 
UN.
30
 OCHA, the lead agency directing humanitarian responses to conflict-related and 
environmental emergencies, is ambitiously tasked with mainstreaming human security across the 
UN system and, since 2009, has also made climate change a thematic focus for its humanitarian 
advocacy.
31
 However, the Human Security Unit run by OCHA has struggled with budgetary 
constraints, inter-agency competition and a lack of understanding of human security by UN Country 
teams.
32
 As noted in the next section, OCHA work on climate vulnerability in Central and East 
Africa offers the most prominent example of an operational convergence of its climate change and 
human security advocacy. There is more evidence of a broad human security framing informing 
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recent post-conflict environmental assessments conducted by UNEP, as well as its environmental 
peacebuilding activities within the multi-agency Environment and Security Initiative. Over time, 
UNEP post-conflict assessments have adopted a social vulnerability lens registering people-based 
insecurities around environmental resource needs and threatened livelihoods, although only more 
recently engaging with climate change.
33
 Below I discuss two post-conflict environmental 
assessments, conducted by UNEP in Sudan (2007) and Rwanda (2011), which feature significant 
treatments of climate vulnerability. 
 
Makaremi argues that, since the 1990s, the development interpretation of human security promoted 
by the UN has faced competition from a narrower interpretation focused on protecting people from 
violence. At least in part, he attributes this to a geopolitical appropriation of human security as an 
instrument of foreign policy by several state powers – notably Japan, Norway and Canada – and the 
European Union.
34
 This reading, which concedes that “populations” remain as the principal referent 
of security, nevertheless pinpoints a temporal evolution in human security in the context of Western 
anxieties about terrorism and other expressions of global disorder, with the international legal 
distinctions between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” violence becoming unstable.35 By shifting the 
(in)security lens from social and ecological conditions of life to the bodily or corporeal vulnerability 
on individuals, states and their militaries receive renewed justification as the principal agents for 
controlling or managing the means of violence. Of course, in (post)conflict spaces such actors may 
also be responsible for violence, raising questions about the international legality of violent 
practices employed to further state and/or human security. With specific responsibilities in 
(post)conflict areas, OCHA, UNDP and UNEP all share a commitment to IHL. This raises the 
substantive question, addressed in the next section, of how conflict situations and legacies feed into 
their assessments of climate vulnerability. 
 
From a humanitarian law perspective, climate harm exacerbates the existing legal indeterminacy of 
IHL regarding the cause and scope of impermissible environmental damage.
36
 There is ongoing 
disagreement amongst states over the threshold at which armed violence may be categorised as 
conflict under IHL, despite accepted criteria on intensity and spatial (territorial) extent.
37
 Even if 
IHL is accepted as applicable in a conflict situation, it is not clear how the general humanitarian 
principles of (military-civilian) distinction, military necessity and proportionality can assist in 
protecting civilian populations from  increased environmental harm as a result of warfare – an 
uncertainty exacerbated for the slow onset but volatile effects of climate change. There are practical 
reasons, then, for humanitarian agencies to prefer a “natural disasters” template when addressing 
the climate vulnerability of people scarred by armed conflict and military occupation.
38
 Non-
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binding international norms, such as the Hyogo Framework for Action on Disaster Risk 
Management, offer familiar and flexible guidance for dealing with climate hazards.
39
 This, indeed, 
was the conceptual starting-point for a Task Force on Climate Change convened in 2009-10 by the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee – the leading international forum for coordinating the work of 
UN and non-UN humanitarian actors.
40
 However, a key question then arises as to whether the 
policy preference of UN agencies for a disaster risk reduction approach has occluded issues of 
responsibility for conflict-related environmental harm. How does a biopolitical logic of climate 
insecurity, concerned with the resilience of vulnerable populations, reflect the sovereign authority 
of host states and their responsibilities under IHL? In the next section of the paper I examine these 
questions by drawing on relevant climate assessments in (post)conflict areas. 
 
 
UN CLIMATE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS IN POST(CONFLICT) AREAS 
 
For OCHA the added value of a human security approach in (post)conflict settings is as a people-
centred, collaborative framework attuned to the perceived insecurities and concrete needs of 
affected populations. Countries subject to, or emerging from, violent conflicts are viewed as more 
than developmental failures – they are seen as unstable, often highly volatile, spaces in which the 
pervasive threat and use of violence eviscerates state institutions and societal structures.
41
 Climate 
change impacts, it is claimed, threaten to exacerbate both existing grievances over natural resources 
and conflict-related weaknesses in the provision of basic services.
42
 Since 1994 the Emergency 
Services Branch of OCHA has hosted a dedicated unit (in partnership with the United Nations 
Environment Programme) to coordinate international assistance to countries facing “environmental 
emergencies” – disasters or accidents (natural and/or human-induced) causing or threatening to 
cause severe environmental damage with serious losses to human lives and property. As with other 
disaster assessment within OCHA, international assistance is deemed necessary when such 
emergencies overwhelm national response capacities. In line with IPCC projections of an increase 
in the frequency, intensity and duration of extreme climate-related events (e.g. high temperature and 
precipitation events, flooding sea level rise and drought), climate change impacts are anticipated to 
trigger a marked expansion in the scope and scale of environmental emergencies.
43
 
 
The monsoon floods striking Pakistan in 2010 and 2011 are cited in a Joint UNEP/OCHA 
Environment Unit report to as an example of how climate change can have a compounding effect on 
environmental emergency responses, rendering relief and recovery efforts fragile if they do not 
incorporate long-term climatic trends.
44
 Pakistan has been a test case for humanitarian responses to 
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an environmental crisis in a (post)conflict setting, at least in the north-west of the country where, 
since 2009, there have been violent clashes between the Pakistan military and pro-Taliban militants, 
although there is also as an older, intermittent conflict in the south-west (Balochistan) between 
government forces and separatists. As OCHA designated the conflict in the north-west as a complex 
emergency, where the Pakistan military had been engaged in combat operations, it sought to follow 
established “MCDA guidelines” (“Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to 
Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies”) limiting use of military 
assistance that may be seen as compromising the neutrality and impartiality of international 
humanitarian agencies. This stance had practical implications given that the Pakistan military was 
the principal state vehicle for disaster relief, but was charged by some humanitarian groups with 
offering assistance only to loyal communities in flood-affected conflict areas. The MCDA 
positioning caused splits in the wider UN humanitarian response, as well as tensions with OCHA’s 
own responses to flooding in other parts of the country. Indeed, OCHA food security assessments 
and relief efforts in flood-affected areas varied between “natural disaster” areas and “complex 
emergency” areas, while the Pakistan government and other humanitarian agencies viewed all flood 
impacts as a purely natural disaster.
45
 Independent evaluations of humanitarian responses in 
Pakistan reported weaknesses arising from divergent agency assessments of the needs of affected 
persons. Illustrative of a major gap between OCHA policy pronouncements and operational 
commitments, neither human security nor climate change framings informed disaster and early 
recovery assessments. While humanitarian actors participating in flood relief efforts embraced 
vulnerability as an organising category for needs analysis – e.g. FAO work on food security and 
livelihood loss – there was no common conceptual matrix for analysing vulnerability.46 
 
The most ambitious OCHA programme addressing climate vulnerability in a (post)conflict region 
examines climate change impacts on pastoralism in Central and East Africa. Established in 2009 by 
the OCHA regional office in Nairobi, the programme facilitates inter-agency communication on 
current and future climate stresses on pastoralist communities, as well as strategies to foster 
effective adaptive practices. Climate change, as manifest in a higher frequency and intensity of 
droughts, is predicted to escalate armed, inter-communal conflicts over access to water and grazing 
land.
47
 The programme adopts a disaster risk reduction optic in which the mitigation of pastoralist 
vulnerability to climate impacts is promoted by such technical interventions as drought 
preparedness planning and improved disaster management. Pastoralist insecurity is conceived 
broadly, covering both protection from violence and needs-based threats (e.g. food insecurity and 
livelihood insecurity). It is treated most explicitly in one of the inter-agency partnerships – Security 
in Mobility – created by OCHA under this pastoralist programme.48 The safe movement of 
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pastoralists within and across national borders is seen as pivotal to sustaining their livelihood needs 
in the face of increasing climate stresses. In biopolitical terms, security is associated with the free 
circulation of valued communities. This concern with building the resilience of affected populations 
has incorporated extensive consultations with pastoralists from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Southern Sudan, including their perceptions on the effects of climate variability and 
change. Pastoralists’ own assessments have highlighted geopolitical moves impinging on their lives 
and livelihoods; for example the spatial exclusion of pastoralists by the Tanzanian government from 
the Ngorongoro Conservation Area in the north of the country and government discrimination 
against Somali pastoralists in Kenya’s North Eastern Province.49 State complicity in pastoralist 
insecurity, including the toleration of lawlessness and arms proliferation, contributes to the 
perpetuation of violence – an issue raised more emphatically by OCHA outside the Security in 
Mobility initiative.
50
 Although this raises human rights concerns, state responsibility under IHL is 
diluted by the low intensity and inter-communal character of the armed violence, creating obstacles 
to the application of conflict-related humanitarian norms. 
 
In the case of the Darfur conflict, the Sudanese government, it is claimed, has tried to escape its 
responsibility for large-scale violence by attributing hostilities to regional climate change, 
seemingly supported in this view by the UN Secretary General, citing a UNEP post-conflict 
environmental assessment.
51
 While the latter study cautioned against reductionist accounts of the 
civil war, it still maintained that, at least for Darfur, climate instability and change (alongside 
environmental degradation) were major underlying causes of the conflict, as collapsing pastoralist 
livelihoods caused by desertification and protracted drought exacerbated tribal and ethnic 
tensions.
52
 The UNEP report, one of the most comprehensive assessments managed by its Post-
Conflict and Disaster Management Branch, was integrated into national policy processes and a 
Sudan Country Analysis conducted by the UN Country Team.
53
 It undertook a climate risk 
assessment, relying technically on a previous UNFCCC-assisted national study, which concluded 
that drought, desertification and floods (both natural and human-induced) contribute significantly to 
conflict, population displacement and food insecurity.
54 
Under UN norms of neutrality, UNEP has 
assisted both the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments with environmental capacity-building, 
although allegations remain levelled at political leaders in Khartoum regarding serious human rights 
abuses and repeated violations of IHL. Alongside UNDP, UNEP has worked closely with the 
Sudanese government to develop a climate change adaptation plan under its UNFCCC 
responsibilities. Both the UN agencies and the government treated this national adaptation planning 
as a technical-managerial exercise, conspicuously avoiding any conflict-related assessment of 
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climate vulnerability. In the Sudanese Adaptation Programme of Action delivered in 2007 to 
UNFCCC, there is only a passing reference to the conflict in Darfur as an inter-tribal clash.
55
 
 
As UNEP post-conflict environmental assessments become more extensive in thematic scope and 
more supportive of governance and development interventions in host countries, the political 
context of its assistance assumes more importance. This reflects in part the increasing ambition and 
operational authority of UNEP, which has identified an important role for environmental 
cooperation as a vehicle for peacebuilding in societies emerging from conflict. The long-term goal 
of fostering resilient, sustainable livelihoods in natural resource-dependent populations has opened 
up the issue of political ownership of policy recommendations arising from UNEP post-conflict 
assessments; yet these assessments are, by design, technical and depoliticised.
56
 As Matthew and 
Hammill argue, climate change adaptation offers significant potential as a long-term vehicle for 
peacebuilding addressed to institutional capacity and community resilience.
57
 UNEP support for this 
position suggests that climate change adaptation is now a test bed for biopolitical interventions in 
(post)conflict areas. For example, following an influential post-conflict assessment in Afghanistan 
highlighting serious environmental threats to livelihoods, UNEP is now implementing climate 
change adaptation activities in agricultural communities deemed to be particularly vulnerable to 
climate variability and change, and has assisted the UN Country Team in Afghanistan in developing 
natural resource management and climate adaptive actions informed by peacebuilding aims.
58
 
 
The UNEP post-conflict assessment for Rwanda illustrates this growing interest in climate 
vulnerability. In a comprehensive report for the Rwandan government, disasters and climate change 
feature as a cross-cutting issue because of the reliance of most of the population on rain-fed 
subsistence agriculture on erosion-prone hillsides. Heightened climate vulnerability is linked to 
broader socio-economic processes, including post-conflict resettlement, rapid demographic growth 
and ecological degradation.
 
Disaster risk reduction is presented as the appropriate paradigm for 
institutional capacity-building aligned with cross-sectoral coordination on climate change 
adaptation. The declared goal for such efforts is to build the local resilience of those rural groups 
reliant on natural resources and climate-sensitive livelihoods.
59
 Implementation of these, and other, 
recommendations from the UNEP report fed into wider UN developmental assistance for Rwanda. 
And major donor commitments – notably UK government capitalisation with £22.5 million of a 
national fund for environment and climate change – are supporting Rwandan efforts to promote 
green growth within its economic development and poverty reduction strategy.
60
 UNEP’s  
contribution to the environmental and management policies of the Rwandan government attests to 
the institutional strengthening made possible by such technical-managerial assistance, though the  
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public deference shown to the host government is at odds with security concerns raised elsewhere in 
the UN. For this is a regional geopolitical setting of continued (lower-level) hostilities in which the 
Kagame regime has played an active part, supporting rebel insurgencies and illegal mineral 
exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A UN Security Council Report in 2012 
alleged Rwandan government responsibility in breaking a UN arms embargo and, through its direct 
military support for rebels, also complicity in violations of IHL and human rights.
61
 Insofar as such 
practices increase conflict-related stresses in the region, their effects are relevant to UN assessments 
of socio-environmental vulnerability. It is telling that they do indeed register in UNEP’s post-
conflict environmental assessment for the Congolese government (where the host government is the 
putative victim), though not in terms of IHL.
62
 
 
Occupations and external military interventions comprise a discrete group of war-related conditions 
often associated with complex emergencies, throwing up singular challenges for humanitarianism. 
Protracted military occupations, as with the Indonesian takeover of East Timor (1975-1999) and the 
Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory (since 1967), strain IHL norms designed for limited 
periods of foreign military authority, and also render routine what would otherwise be exceptional 
demands for humanitarian assistance. The environmental protection duties of occupying powers are 
at best uncertain and fare badly against a general backdrop of weak international enforcement of 
humanitarian obligations: as Barnett observes in regard to Timor-Leste, unchecked rights violations 
by military forces are themselves powerful drivers of vulnerability to climate change.
63
 The UNDP-
sponsored Arab Human Development Report 2009 is notable for addressing directly the erosion of 
human security caused by occupation and military interventions, discussing threats to lives and 
livelihoods in Iraq, the occupied Palestinian territory and Somalia. In each case, conflict-induced 
environmental degradation is seen as accentuating the already high social vulnerability of civilian 
populations, although this is not explicitly linked to discussion elsewhere on climate change 
impacts.
64
 
 
A UNDP-funded project (2008-2010) to develop a climate change adaptation strategy for the 
Palestinian Authority represents arguably its most sustained human security analysis of climate 
vulnerability in the context of a military occupation. Informed by UNDP adaptation policy 
frameworks, it treated food and water security for people as the thematic focus for a vulnerability 
assessment designed to identify risks conditions and response capabilities in the face of climate 
variability and (projected) climate change.
65
 The vulnerability assessment drew on consultations 
with state and civil society actors in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as a review of climate change 
modelling applied to the eastern Mediterranean. A revealing parallel with the UN-supported climate 
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adaptation planning for the Sudanese government was, at least initially, a technical-managerial 
framing of climate risk detached from ongoing and pervasive conditions of coercive rule. The 
disruptive impacts of climate variability and change are seen to threaten communities already 
experiencing impaired lives and livelihoods; but the humanitarian sense is from managerial norms 
of natural disaster risk reduction rather than IHL rules regulating the protection of civilians and 
their living conditions from serious, indiscriminate harm.
66
 I note below the tensions in this process, 
because Palestinian “stakeholders” insisted that Israeli occupational practices generated and 
exacerbated environmental stresses, justifying a conflict-structured rendering of climate 
vulnerability. While faithful to the conflict experience of the inhabitants of Gaza and the West 
Bank, these stakeholder representations unsettled the largely technical approach of UNDP. Yet, as 
Conca and Wallace suggest for UNEP’s post-conflict environmental assessments (including their 
Palestinian assessments), the adoption of such a depoliticised stance seems to be necessary for 
achieving cooperation with host governments.
67
 This is not to suggest that UN bodies and other 
international organisations do not monitor occupational practices or consider their environmental 
impacts, but rather that an operational focus on managing biophysical risks largely avoids 
politically charged questions about IHL accountability for the production of social and ecological 
harm. 
 
 
LOCATING CLIMATE INSECURITY IN (POST)CONFLICT SPACES 
 
The exposure of people to armed conflict and related hostile acts creates conditions of violence for 
which humanitarian action is conventionally justified; that is, the provision of relief to individuals 
and groups facing immediate threats to their lives and freedoms. For societies scarred by conflict, 
serious disruptions to life as a direct or indirect consequence of climate change may also legitimate 
humanitarian assistance and, by their interactions with present or past hostilities, are likely to bridge 
two discrete humanitarian traditions responding, respectively, to armed conflict and natural 
disasters. There is recognition by UNDP that conflicts typically exacerbate disaster impacts and 
vulnerabilities, although these disaster-conflict interfaces are strongly context-dependent. Both 
through slow- and rapid onset effects, climate change is seen as having the potential to intensify a 
vicious circle of violence, social vulnerability and disaster risk.
68
 The category of complex 
emergencies offers an integrative optic for addressing multiple trajectories of harm in situations of 
chronic conflict and collapsing political authority, triggering a system-wide humanitarian response 
through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
 
However, unless they cause immediate and 
substantial harm, consideration of climate impacts is likely to be crowded out in complex 
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emergencies by an urgent humanitarian focus on protecting civilians from the effects of armed 
conflict.
69
 
 
The broad notion of human security advanced by the UN provides a more holistic framework for 
identifying, and addressing, critical threats endangering people in (post)conflict (and other) 
contexts. Human security shares with humanitarianism a cosmopolitan regard for the welfare of 
“humanity” as such – part of a family of universalist discourses, including human development and 
human rights, underpinning the identity of the UN and many international NGOs.
70
 At the same 
time, there is a distinctive moral grammar to human security which, applied to (post)conflict areas, 
facilitates a shift from relief-oriented action to preventive measures for risk reduction informed by a 
biopolitical concern with securing human lives. OCHA, UNDP and UNEP all have an interest in 
climate change impacts as relevant to assessments of environmental vulnerability in (post)conflict 
areas. To be sure, there is a notable gap between policy advocacy on climate change as a major 
source of human security (notably by OCHA and UNDP) and (post)conflict environmental 
assessments. Even in cases where climate vulnerability is a salient theme, human security as such is 
not a common label for categorising threats to people. Nevertheless, the framing and content of 
these assessments by all three UN bodies reveal that “climate insecurity” is understood 
overwhelmingly in terms of vulnerable people, with common references to food security and water 
security, as well as evaluations of the resilience of communities with climate-sensitive livelihoods.
71
 
I now argue that, at least for the (post)conflict assessments summarised above, the defining of 
human life in biopolitical terms downplays the effects of organised violence in producing climate 
insecurity. This is evident in: (i) the rendering of climate change as an extrinsic source of harm; (ii) 
the displacement of responsibility for conflict-related harms; and (iii) the use of depoliticised 
notions of capacity-building for climate adaptation. 
 
(i) Climate Change as an External Driver of Vulnerability 
It is not surprising that OCHA, UNDP and UNEP defer to UNFCCC and IPCC communications for 
authoritative accounts of climate risk. In the Human Development Report 2007/2008, UNDP 
represents “dangerous” climate change – defined, in line with the IPCC, as a rise in global average 
temperatures above two degrees centigrade compared to pre-industrial levels – as “an avoidable 
catastrophe” of large-scale human development losses, but one probable in the light of IPCC 
emissions scenarios.
72
 Whilst acknowledging the role of pre-existing social and economic 
vulnerabilities in mediating climate impacts, five “risk multipliers” for human development 
reversals are forecast to result from climate-induced biophysical shocks: reduced agricultural 
productivity, water insecurity, greater exposure to coastal flooding and extreme weather events, 
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ecosystem collapse, and increased health risks.
73
 The sourcing of climate danger in externally 
received, biophysical stresses is characteristic of the (post)conflict environment and climate reports 
discussed above. None of these studies, understandably, had independent scientific capacity for 
regional climate modelling or downscaling, relying on IPCC scenarios and other relevant climate 
science. In the case of Pakistan, the climate change framing of the 2010 floods in a report by the 
joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit bore little relation to UN operational activities in the country. 
Across the more substantive assessments of climate vulnerability, there is a tendency uncritically to 
adopt climate change scenarios from the scientific literature without setting out the methodological 
caveats and simplifying assumptions inherent in their use. References to international climate 
science lend epistemic authority to the emphasis in these reports on external environmental stresses 
as determinants of climate vulnerability, reproducing a largely natural hazards perspective on 
climate risk. 
 
Registering climate risks in terms of current and projected biophysical impacts necessarily captures 
objective environmental changes to which people are, or may be, exposed. The analytical choice for 
climate assessments in (post)conflict settings is the explanatory weight accorded to these effects in 
relation to the social vulnerability of affected populations. Use of a natural disasters framing can 
stress extreme events and climate features over root causes of vulnerability.
74
 The UN (post)conflict 
assessments examined were open to the social production of climate vulnerability, including the 
effects of organised violence. However, the consideration of conflict impacts was more as an 
additional set of biophysical stresses on a vulnerable population than as experiential threats to, or 
violations of, the lives of affected individuals. There is a significant difference here between the 
UNEP post-conflict environmental assessments treating legacy effects of discrete conflict episodes 
and the climate studies of OCHA (East and Central Africa) and UNDP (occupied Palestinian 
territory) addressing ongoing “low-intensity” conflict or military occupation. In the latter case of 
continuing hostilities, projections of climate-driven biophysical impacts on food and water security 
were challenged by Palestinian consultees insisting that Israeli occupational practices were 
constitutive of their social vulnerability to climate risk, notably the appropriation and degradation of 
environmental resources for military and settlement purposes.
75
 
 
(ii) Displacing Responsibility for Conflict-Related Harms 
As the idea of human security is in principle context-specific, its application to (post)conflict 
societies could reasonably be expected to integrate climate threats with the effects of current or past 
conflicts. The threat or use of violent force related to armed conflict or military occupation is of 
course likely to be the principal danger to lives and livelihoods in the absence of peaceful relations. 
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IHL features clear rules governing the behaviour of those engaged in hostilities, including 
responsibility for conflict-related harms deemed to be breaches of IHL: the global coherence of 
these rules has been weakened by the “war on terror” and their implementation is at best selective, 
although their legal force arguably remains robust.
76
 I noted above that there are uncertainties over 
the environmental obligations of IHL, and climate change impacts will test further the humanitarian 
rules designed to protect civilians. Yet human security and humanitarian readings of climate change 
drawing on a disaster risk reduction model are, I argue, inappropriate by themselves for settings in 
which systemic coercion conditions people’s lives. As David Keen notes more generally for 
humanitarian action, the tendency to attribute damages to extrinsic factors removes responsibility 
from social and political actors.
77 
In (post)conflict areas a focus on “unintentional” climate damage 
can render even more indistinct the responsibility of combatants and occupying forces to safeguard 
the lives and living conditions of civilians, displacing responsibility for conflict-related harms. 
 
Disaster risk reduction is central to UN development support and is being integrated into relevant 
strategic planning tools, including Common Country Assessments and the UN Development 
Assistance Framework.
78
 Again, though, risk reduction – including for climate change – is located 
firmly within the natural disasters inflection of humanitarian and development aid, detached from 
IHL and the singular hazards faced by people in (post)conflict zones. For complex emergencies this 
division can be both counter-intuitive and dysfunctional. Thus, the UN-led humanitarian responses 
to flooding in Pakistan were hampered by competing needs assessments and notions of 
vulnerability. Confusion was sown within the international relief effort by the simultaneous use of 
“natural disaster” and “complex emergency” designations, causing disagreements over the 
appropriateness of cooperating with the Pakistan military to distribute assistance. In Sudan, a 
climate change adaptation report facilitated by UNEP and UNDP highlighted climate impacts on 
agriculture, health and water resources,
79
 yet nowhere was there any acceptance by the Sudanese 
government of its role in the appropriation and destruction of the agricultural assets of southern 
ethnic groups (let alone the major casualties caused by the Sudanese military and government-
armed militia groups). Even a separate UNDP project (2004-2009) for reducing the “root-causes” of 
violent disputes between pastoralists and farmers across Sudan chose to frame these as “natural 
resource based conflicts” triggered by severe droughts and the growth of mechanised farming, 
ignoring the complicity of the national government in stoking violence due to its manipulation of 
farm leases and grain markets for political gain.
80
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(iii) The Depoliticisation of Capacity-Building for Climate Adaptation 
Of course, the principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality informing the standard 
definition of humanitarianism serve, as Barnett and Weiss note,
81
 an important function in securing 
access to those in need, especially in situations of armed conflict. An apolitical stance is practically 
proven to increase the likelihood of successfully negotiating access with those coordinating hostile 
acts, though the cost of not offending a host government or military administration is often to avoid 
confronting perpetrators of harm and also to treat those suffering as little more than victims. Yet the 
ambitious goal of human security approaches is to avoid or mitigate both immediate threats and 
longer-term reversals in human development. And proponents of human security have claimed that 
this preventive goal can encompass critical reflection on, and policy engagement with, the political-
economic drivers of climate vulnerability.
82
 UN assessments of climate vulnerability in 
(post)conflict zones favour technical-managerial interventions to build up the “resilience” of 
vulnerable populations to climate risks. The discourse of “stakeholder participation” guiding 
institutional capacity-building for climate adaptation suggests a break from subjectivities of 
victimhood, but often sidesteps the political conditions necessary for the meaningful involvement of 
civilian populations subject to the effects of armed conflict or foreign military occupation. For 
example, Palestinians equate effective agency for climate change adaptation with sovereign 
authority over their land and water resources. Post-conflict contexts, where organised violence is 
largely or completely suppressed, offer more scope for developing politically inclusive strategies 
for climate change adaptation.
83
 
 
The importing into conflict-prone countries of techniques for climate risk reduction responds to a 
distinctive Western anxiety over the growing prospect of “climate conflict” and “climate 
refugees”.84 Climate vulnerability assessments and institution building for climate adaptation thus 
accompany other donor-led interventions addressing perceived governance failings in (post)conflict 
spaces. International organisations justify these interventions as protecting the core freedoms of 
indigenous populations, whilst at the same time legitimating liberal order-building under the rubric 
of good climate governance. It is disputable whether human securitisation has been so one-sided 
and functional for the geopolitical interests of global Northern states as some critics of biopolitical 
governance maintain,
85 
but the eco-managerial articulation of (post) conflict climate vulnerability 
by UN agencies has bypassed important aspects of the conflict-regulation strand of 
humanitarianism, notably whether there are IHL responsibilities attached to the production of 
climate vulnerability and harm in societies affected by conflict. 
 
 
 18 
CONCLUSION 
 
OCHA, UNDP and UNEP have all identified climate risks as relevant to their work in areas 
affected by armed conflict. At the policy level, they also share UN-wide commitments to treat 
human beings, rather than states, as the most appropriate referent of security. Human security – 
broadly understood as freedom from serious threats to health and welfare – justifies assessments of 
climate impacts relative to other stresses affecting populations in (post)conflict regions: biophysical 
shocks or pressures as a result of (projected) climate change have become a thematic concern for 
humanitarian initiatives and longer-term development assistance. While human security 
terminology has less operational currency than may be expected from the policy advocacy of these 
UN bodies (notably OCHA and UNDP), the selected (post)conflict environmental assessments 
clearly express ideas consistent with the human securitisation of climate change; for example, a 
recurrent, people-centred interest in food security and water security, as well as a focus on climate-
sensitive livelihoods. I have argued that their work on climate vulnerability – located within post-
conflict environmental assessments (UNEP) or climate adaptation initiatives (OCHA, UNDP) – is 
informed by a biopolitical paradigm of disaster risk reduction addressing the resilience and 
circulatory freedom of vulnerable people. This is of course a normative agenda, but one that 
assumes a depoliticised stance in accord with UN principles of neutrality and impartiality. 
 
The favouring of the natural disasters domain of humanitarian reason to understand climate 
insecurity mirrors UN strategies on disaster reduction, offering a logical template for climate risk 
management in (post)conflict regions. Given their expertise and experience of working in areas 
affected by violent conflict or foreign military occupation, it is nevertheless striking that OCHA, 
UNDP and UNEP have conspicuously avoided the conflict regulation domain of IHL when 
examining climate vulnerability in (post)conflict settings. Political neutrality and operational access 
to those in need are cogent reasons why these agencies may choose to refrain from scrutinising 
particular conditions and trajectories of violence. As I claim above, though, the consequences of 
this bureaucratic comity include the displacement of responsibility for conflict-related harms and 
the depoliticisation of capacity-building for climate resilience. Sourcing serious climate threats as 
externally received biophysical impacts – as what Fassin coins a “pure form of misfortune” beyond 
human responsibility
86
 – is more amenable to technical-managerial interventions placed outside 
geopolitical relations of power. 
 
Yet biopolitical assessments of climate vulnerability in (post)conflict spaces have their own 
geopolitical conditions and effects. The creation of humanitarian spaces of exception is itself the 
 19 
imposition, by states and international organisations, of sovereign authority on behalf of global 
peace and security.
87
 In this sense, the human securitisation of climate change is arguably one facet 
of liberal order-building in unstable regions; and the elision of the IHL inflection of humanitarian 
action reveals a biopolitical preference for the adaptive fitness of a population in the face of 
biophysical stresses rather than as a politically transformative community of citizens. The latter 
choice, for (post)conflict societies, would bear full witness to violence and its effects, mapping out a 
“geopolitical distribution of corporeal vulnerability” in line with all legal norms of responsibility for 
serious harm.
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